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Abstract The Germany-Poland-Russia Trialogue Workshop held at the DGAP in 
December 2015 focused on security. It brought together a group of Russian, Pol-
ish, and German experts to discuss their respective national security discourses 
and the security situation in Europe more generally. The three short papers includ-
ed here provide brief analyses of how the security situation is currently perceived 
in each of the three countries. From the German side, the answer was the refugee 
crisis. Polish experts pointed to the threat posed by Russia, while the Russian 
speakers described their worries about color revolutions and regime change in the 
post-Soviet sphere. Certainly, perceptions of security threats differ greatly among 
EU member states, to say nothing of the difference between Russia and the EU 
as a whole. Only real understanding of our counterparts can help in forging a new 
modus vivendi and overcoming the dangerous situation in which Europe currently 
finds itself. The Germany-Poland-Russia Trialogues aim to forge better understand-
ing of “the other side” through presentations and opportunities for discussion, 
offering crucial first steps toward overcoming misperceptions and stereotypes. 
The Trialogue meets regularly under the aegis of the DGAP (German Council on 
Foreign Relations), IMEMO (Primakov Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations Russian Academy of Sciences), and PISM (Polish Institute of International 
Affairs) and in cooperation with and financial support from SDPZ (Foundation for 
Polish-German Cooperation) and the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Warsaw office.
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Foreword
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern 
Ukraine have undermined the post-Cold-War security 
order in Europe. Its recent actions have called into ques-
tion not only the sovereignty and borders of the Ukrai-
nian state but also the very foundations of contemporary 
European security: the Paris Charter and the Budapest 
Memorandum. The main goal of this destabilizing policy 
is to renegotiate the principles of European security and 
to obtain guarantees from the West for Russian influ-
ence in the former Soviet states. Rather than strengthen 
the OSCE and its approach of collective security with 
equal rights and equal security for all participating states, 
Russian leaders are promoting a new style of bargaining 
among Great Powers. This harks back to Yalta, or even to 
the Vienna Congress of Metternich’s day. Moscow has its 
sights set on a deal with Washington involving nothing 
less than security guarantees for Russia and the recogni-
tion of its exclusive sphere of influence.
With the Western sanctions, the economic, social, and 
political interdependence between Russia and the EU has 
become a threat to Russia’s own security. The EU is using 
economic ties to put Russia under pressure to stop its 
action in Ukraine. Current Russian policy aims to cut off 
these links. 
The escalation in tensions between Russia and the EU 
is first and foremost the result of completely different 
threat perceptions. Brussels perceives its neighborhood 
policy as a guarantor of economic and political reforms, 
stabilization, and growing social welfare in the countries 
on its eastern borders. The Russian elite, on the other 
hand, perceives that policy as a serious infringement 
into its traditional sphere of influence. From Moscow’s 
perspective, this undermines Russia’s birthright in its im-
mediate neighborhood, paving the way for “color revolu-
tions” and regime change. Indeed, as the Kremlin sees it, 
the main aim of Western policy in post-Soviet countries 
is not so much regime change in, say, Kiev but in Moscow 
itself. By this logic, the mass demonstrations that took 
place in Moscow and Saint Petersburg in 2011–12, during 
which thousands of Russians protested the outcome of 
parliamentary elections and questioned the presidential 
elections, are seen as proof of the pernicious influence of 
Western policy. 
The main problem with this way of looking at the 
world is that it sees society as something to be manipu-
lated rather than a relevant political actor in its own right. 
It underestimates social change and the power of social 
movements to influence national and international poli-
tics. For this reason, Russian leaders have underestimated 
domestic political dynamics on several occasions – not 
only in Russia 2011–12 but also particularly in Ukraine in 
2004 and again in 2013–14. High-ranking Russian officials 
argue that the currents that brought about Ukraine’s 
2004 Orange Revolution and the subsequent Euromaidan 
movement were the result of outside meddling – chiefly 
by the US, which they see as wanting to weaken Russia 
just as it did in Cold-War times. It is extremely difficult 
to break free of this paradigm because it is so deeply 
grounded in the Russian ruling elite’s historical stereo-
types and paranoia.
Russia’s leaders have the impression that their country 
is at war with the West. This February, Russian Prime 
Minister Dmitri Medvedev spoke at the Munich Security 
Conference not about an upcoming Cold War but rather 
confirmed that we are already in a new Cold War. Seen 
from Russia, this hardly seemed spectacular; for the 
Kremlin considers it a fact. 
Indeed, Russian media and decision makers were more 
surprised by the Western “overreaction” to Medvedev’s 
speech than to its actual content, which to them seemed 
simply to offer a sober analysis of reality. This again 
confirms the degree to which so many European politi-
cians fail to understand the mindset and logic of Russian 
politics. Only gradually are they realizing that a funda-
mental conflict with Russia is underway – not only over 
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Ukraine but also about norms, principles, and the security 
order in Europe.
One example of this is the Russian propaganda cur-
rently being rolled out via various media platforms. From 
a Russian point of view, Moscow’s robust “information 
war” is simply a reaction to similar media tactics being 
conducted by the West. By this logic, the activities of 
RT and Sputnik – to say nothing of the legions of “trolls” 
posting negative comments on the Internet portals of 
Western media and NGOs – question the existing media 
discourse in Europe and aim to tell “the story behind the 
story.” This undermines the credibility of Western media 
and aims to confuse the public on what are facts and what 
is fiction. The basic instruments of this “war” are noth-
ing new, even if they have taken on cutting-edge, digital 
dimensions. What is surprising is how little the EU is 
prepared to engage in this kind of conflict, for it hardly 
arrived from out of the blue. 
Russian decision makers have studied for years how 
the West, and particularly the US, makes use of media 
and non-governmental organizations to “manipulate” 
decision making and promote their preferred policies. 
The discussion in US media that took place in the lead-up 
to the 2002 invasion of Iraq continues to furnish an object 
lesson. In their minds, they are simply responding in kind: 
undermining the credibility of Western democracies, its 
media and institutions. It is worth noting, however, that 
Russian action with regard to media, supporting groups 
and using fake institutions is much more about under-
standing and using the weaknesses of the West than 
pursuing a long-term strategy or offering an alternative 
concept to Western media.
Media war aside, European politicians tend to overes-
timate the strategic depth of Russian policy on a variety 
of fronts. In fact, it is much more reactive and tactical 
than it is strategic. Moscow’s main advantage is that it is 
capable of rapid, non-democratic decision making and, 
as such, can be extraordinarily bold. It is accountable to 
no one, and this of course is also its weakness. Today’s 
Russia lacks a system of checks and balances and has no 
functioning correctives. Its current leadership is driving 
Russia toward deep political and economic crisis as well 
as international isolation. This makes the country even 
more vulnerable and will, in turn, increase the reactive-
ness of Russian policy. The weaker Russia becomes, the 
more aggressively its leadership will react. The funda-
mental loss of trust between Russia and the EU has cre-
ated a stalemate situation from which neither side knows 
how to emerge. Even if Russian leaders try to improve 
the relationship at least rhetorically, as Medvedev did in 
Munich, European politicians no longer believe the words 
of Russian officials. 
This is a very dangerous situation, for the clear rules 
and red lines of the Cold War are absent from today’s 
global context. Our December 2015 Trialogue Workshop – 
the fourth in four years – focused on security. It brought 
together a group of Russian, Polish, and German experts 
to discuss their respective national security discourses 
and the security situation in Europe more generally. As a 
series, the Trialogues aim to forge better understanding 
of “the other side” through presentations and opportuni-
ties for discussion. We believe these are crucial first steps 
in trying to overcome misperceptions and stereotypes. 
Under the current circumstances, frank dialogue of this 
sort is more important than ever.
We asked the participants to describe their country’s 
“main security threat.” From the German side, the answer 
was the refugee crisis. Polish experts pointed to the threat 
posed by Russia, while the Russian speakers described 
their worries about color revolutions and regime change 
in the post-Soviet sphere. 
Certainly, it is necessary to acknowledge how very 
different the perceptions among EU member states can 
be, to say nothing of the difference between Russia and 
the EU as a whole. Only with a real rather than a wishful 
understanding of our counterparts can we work on a new 
modus vivendi and overcome the dangerous situation in 
which Europe currently finds itself. 
The Germany-Poland-Russia Trialogue is conducted by 
the DGAP, IMEMO, PISM, SDPZ, and the Warsaw office of 
the Heinrich Böll Foundation. It will continue to pursue 
this topic in further workshops and will regularly present 
publications derived from those events. The three short 
papers included here provide short analyses of how the 
security situation is currently perceived in each of the 
three countries. 
Stefan Meister, DGAP
4 A New Helsinki Needed? What Security Model for Europe?
DGAPanalyse  / Nr. 3 / April 2016
What Security Model for Europe?  
The Discourse in Germany 
Jana Puglierin
How has the security situation changed for Germany in 
the context of the Ukraine conflict? What are the coun-
try’s main security challenges? What future models are 
being discussed?
Before the protests on Kiev’s Maidan square – prompt-
ed by President Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the 
European Union Association Agreement at the November 
2013 EU summit in Vilnius – made their way into German 
headlines, Ukraine was a country not well known by most 
Germans and not very popular in the German media. 
Yanukovych’s “No” and the start of the protests came as a 
total surprise to German politicians, media, and society. 
Once the Maidan movement had begun, however, events 
in Ukraine received comparatively high levels of attention 
in the German public sphere. This increased following 
Russia’s occupation of Crimea. Early on, a divisive and 
polarized debate emerged about Germany’s stance vis-à-
vis Russia.
Prominent figures like former German chancellors 
Helmut Schmidt and Gerhard Schröder, known to their 
critics as “Putin-Versteher” (Putin sympathizers), publicly 
expressed a certain “understanding” for Russia’s actions. 
Schmidt went so far as to say that he could not see any vi-
olation of international law, while Schröder compared the 
Russian invasion of Crimea with NATO’s actions in Koso-
vo in 1999. Both attributed responsibility for the crisis 
merely to the West and to the new government in Ukraine 
and advocated that Germany play a neutral, mediating 
role. Some parts of the German public and business world 
shared these views, but members of the current German 
government did not. Nor did most politicians (with the ex-
ception of Die Linke), foreign policy experts, or the major-
ity of the media, which openly and decisively condemned 
Russia’s actions from the very beginning. In their view, 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its spoiling behavior in 
eastern Ukraine put at stake the principles of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity – and, as such, the very the basis 
of Europe’s peace order. The heated discussion that arose 
between these two camps – Putin sympathizers and Putin 
critics – deeply divided the German public.
The Perspective of the German Government, Espe-
cially the View from the Chancellery 
The German government played an active role in re-
sponding to the Ukraine crisis from the very beginning. 
For the first time since 1945, Germany took the main lead-
ership position in a major conflict in Europe. Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, who had never been known for a particu-
larly interest in foreign policy, took charge of the crisis 
as chief Western diplomat. She immediately declared 
Russia’s armed takeover of Crimea to be unacceptable to 
today’s Europe, condemning its “annexation” as a funda-
mental violation of international law and the European 
security order. Soon she became the driving force behind 
the EU’s sanctions against Russia. Her engagement came 
as a surprise for most observers – inside and outside 
Germany. 
Some observers expected that the SPD’s Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, Gerhard Schröder’s political protégé, would 
become a kind of counterpart to the CDU’s Angela Merkel. 
But when it came to the Ukraine conflict, Steinmeier 
condemned Russia’s actions as resolutely as Merkel did. 
This was particularly difficult for him due to the SPD’s 
longstanding tradition of favoring Ostpolitik – a policy of 
putting Russia first and robust engagement with the coun-
try. It also contradicted Steinmeier’s initial attempt when 
he took office in 2013 to renew a “modernization partner-
ship” with Russia.
Both Merkel and Steinmeier argued that Germany 
was not (and is still not) willing to accept that European 
borders could be changed by force. Nor is it ready to 
accept the notion of a Russian “sphere of influence.” Any 
security model for Europe is therefore unacceptable if it is 
based on ideas like “spheres of influence” or the Concert 
of Europe (referring to the division of post-Napoleonic 
Europe among the continent’s great powers). That is as 
true of a “new Yalta Agreement” as a “new Congress of 
Vienna,” or any other security model following similar 
lines. As Merkel put it, “Outdated thinking in terms of 
spheres of influence which tramples international law 
underfoot must not be allowed to prevail. I firmly believe 
that it will not prevail, even though the road may be long, 
even though it may be arduous and bring with it many 
setbacks.”1
For Germany, the fundamental liberal ideas of sover-
eignty, equality, and the freedom of states to choose their 
alliances are non negotiable. It is therefore equally dif-
ficult for Germany to sympathize with the idea of tolerat-
ing the existing (semi-) autocratic regimes in Russia and 
parts of its neighborhood as a new guiding principle for 
the OSCE. From a German official perspective, this would 
represent a serious step backward from the provisions of 
the Paris Charter of 1990. It also contradicts Germany’s 
understanding of free civil societies and their right to 
express their will publicly.
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The Main Security Challenges for Germany 
When it comes to Russia and the Ukrainian crisis, the 
major security challenges for Germany are first of all “an 
attack on NATO territory,” especially on the Baltic states, 
and, second, the prospect of “hybrid warfare” or “non-lin-
ear warfare” waged by Russia. Germany’s answer to this 
is to strengthen NATO (using all means within the NATO-
Russia Final Act of 1997 without going any further) and to 
weaken Russia through economic sanctions. While doing 
this, however, the government is also consistently seeking 
dialogue with Russia and avoiding everything that could 
escalate the situation. To this end, Germany has rejected 
putting Western “boots on the ground” in Ukraine and 
has also strictly opposed the delivery of weapons. Stein-
meier never tires of points out that “there is no military 
solution to the conflict in Ukraine.”2 He and his colleagues 
also state frequently that peace and stability without 
Russia is not possible in Europe. This position is shared by 
a majority of CDU, SPD, and Green party members. Only 
some conservative defense experts and parts of the Ger-
man military have stressed that NATO’s Rapid Action Plan 
was not appropriate to really deter Russia and should be 
followed by harsher means.
Outlook
As things have grown calmer on the war front, Germany’s 
general attention to the Ukraine crisis has decreased. The 
refugee crisis in the EU, the fight against ISIS, and the 
complex developments in Syria have dominated the news 
overwhelmingly, putting the German government under 
much pressure. Priorities have shifted. The Ukranian 
crisis is no longer seen as the biggest threat to European 
security. Naturally, however, the chancellery has a strong 
interest in finally fixing the situation in Ukraine in order 
to dedicate more time and effort to getting the refugee 
crisis under control. The government seeks the imple-
mentation of the Minsk agreement, which helped to calm 
things down to a certain extent so far, and is pushing for 
elections in the Donbas region – probably before Ukraine 
is ready. 
Meanwhile, the fear of a possible escalation leading to 
a bigger European war has practically vanished. Russia 
seems to be an “indispensable” nation to end the Syrian 
war, and Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Stein-
meier have recently invited President Putin to return to 
the negotiating table. At the same time both still under-
line that only the full implementation of the Minsk Agree-
ment will lead to the full lifting of sanctions. 
This position is controversial. Sigmar Gabriel and 
others within the SPD ultimately started to question the 
current sanctions. Gabriel is supported by the German 
business community, particularly by its Committee on 
Eastern European Economic Relations (Ost-Ausschuss). 
Gabriel even went to Moscow for a friendly visit, which 
the Kremlin later described as amicable and constructive. 
Merkel’s success – as impressive as it was – in winning 
acceptance for financial sanctions from the German busi-
ness lobby is also fragile, since most key executives are 
eager to normalize relations with Russia.
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Poland’s Security Debate 2014–2015:  
Anxiety and Resolve
Marek Świerczyński
Poland’s threat perception changed dramatically in the 
aftermath of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in early 
2014. A country that has cherished the idea of a unified, 
free, and peaceful Europe since it joined the EU in 2004 is 
now confronted with the vision of war close to its borders. 
For the first time in 15 years – that is, since Poland’s acces-
sion to NATO in 1999 – anxiety prevails over feelings of 
strong transatlantic security.
What was actually shocking was not that the Russians 
did what they did but that they did it so quickly and seam-
lessly in terms of power projection capabilities – as if by a 
push of a button by the Kremlin. Poland has long revered 
the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and 
independence. Watching Russia capture territory by force 
and fuel separatism in Ukraine, a friendly and strategi-
cally important country to Poland, marked a tectonic shift 
in its security landscape.
Although Poland’s security pundits were among the 
few in Europe to realize the dangerous implications of 
the Russian-Georgian war back in 2008, their voices were 
largely neglected not only in Europe but at home as well.3 
In 2014, the toughest military challenge to face Poland 
since World War II arrived just as its armed forces were in 
the middle of a deep restructuring process. As such they 
were unprepared for the kind of threat posed by Rus-
sia’s hybrid tactics in Ukraine – not to mention for all-out 
defense.
Ghosts of the past have now reemerged, from deeply 
rooted doubts about the willingness of Western allies 
to defend NATO’s eastern flank to suspicions that the 
recent reductions of the country’s military may have been 
instigated on purpose by traitors and, finally, to the fear 
that, once again, Russia and Germany are plotting behind 
Poland’s back to carve it up. Obviously, this last con-
cern is not a result of any military cooperation between 
Berlin and Moscow but is rather inspired by the punish-
ing energy policy the two countries are jointly pursuing, 
the most recent manifestation of which was the Nord 
Stream 2 agreement.
But to say that Poland is frozen with fear of war is to go 
too far. If anything, anxieties have given a new impetus 
for the country to push for more security both within 
NATO and the EU. Poland has raised the level of military 
cooperation with European and transatlantic partners to 
unprecedented levels and has taken the lead in NATO’s 
shift in focus toward its core defense roles. On a bilateral 
level, within Europe Poland successfully approached 
Germany, France, the UK, and the Nordic countries for 
stronger military liaisons. Poland and Sweden signed a 
bilateral defense agreement under the previous Polish 
government. Estonia was the first country that Andrzej 
Duda visited upon his election as Poland’s new president, 
and Poland has stated that Finland’s system of territorial 
defense will serve as a model for its own new volunteer 
and reserve force.4
Previously unheard of numbers of NATO troops have 
been training on Polish ranges – on land, sea, and in the 
air; rotational presence of aviation, armored, paratroop, 
and special operation forces has been established in 
multiple locations across the country. US warplanes have 
used abandoned airstrips in Polish forests, demonstrating 
their ability in case of an emergency to forward deploy to 
remote places with limited logistical footprints. In March 
2015, a US Patriot battery staged exercises just outside 
Warsaw with a scenario of massive Russian air and mis-
sile assault. The scenario involved hundreds of air sorties 
and Iskander TBM (missile) strikes. 
Despite these active reassurance measures, however, 
Poland’s debate has been focused on an issue that is some-
what more difficult to secure: permanent NATO presence. 
It was in Weimar on April 1, 2014 that Radosław Sikorski, 
Poland’s foreign minister at the time, said he would be 
happy if two NATO armored brigades would be perma-
nently stationed in Poland.5 It was a characteristically 
bold statement for Sikorski. At that time nobody seemed 
to notice the date – April Fool’s Day – and indeed, two 
weeks later with the annexation of Crimea, nobody was 
in the mood for joking. The goal of “two heavy brigades” 
has since become the official policy of the government in 
Warsaw, despite the fact that for the analysts in Germany 
and in Poland, that perspective started more as a dream 
vision than a genuine aim.
NATO is still working on the new posture arrangement, 
but domestically, Poland has introduced some radical 
amendments. These included physically strengthening 
military bases in the east of the country, shifts in military 
procurements, increasing the number of active profes-
sional troops, and intensifying training for both reservists 
and volunteers. The new Polish government led by the 
Law and Justice party (PiS) is likely to emphasize ter-
ritorial defense, NATO presence, and regional alliances 
– while halting some of the key armament deals.
Russia – not long ago regarded by Poland as a strategic 
partner – was officially listed as a potential threat in the 
new military strategy published in 2014.6 The language of 
the document and the follow-up exercises and decisions 
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make clear that if Poland sees any danger in the near 
future, that danger comes from Russia.
With the NATO summit coming to Warsaw in July 2016 
and with the Ukraine crisis still high on the European 
agenda (as the Minsk Agreement’s expiration date ap-
proaches), Warsaw will remain focused on helping Kiev. 
President Duda wants to address the issue with an inter-
national conference and multilateral agreement – broader 
than Minsk – that is based on Ukraine’s territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty prior to Russian aggression. He will 
also push for establishing permanent NATO bases on the 
Alliance’s eastern flank. This is also one of the key secu-
rity policy demands outlined by the new PiS government, 
although realities in Europe and the US will nonetheless 
make it difficult to fully implement. PiS is happy to accept 
rotational persistent presence of allied troops, especially 
those of the US Army – since it relies much more heavily 
on the US than it does on NATO as a whole.
That approach has not been questioned in domestic 
political debate. Poles still tend to see America as the 
pillar of European security, especially versus Russia. In 
their eyes, just as PiS puts it, NATO is good, but the US is 
better in terms of defense. Some experts and politicians, 
mainly left-wing and liberal, try to underline the role of 
EU security policy and the importance of international 
bodies like OSCE, but those seem to have little appeal in 
the face of Abrams battle tanks firing live ammunition on 
Polish training ranges. And with the domination of right-
wing and conservative policies due to last year’s double 
election victories, the nuanced approach to understand-
ing security is in retreat.
As Western Europe offers only a lukewarm reaction 
to the idea of strengthening the defense structures on 
Russia’s border, Warsaw will look to Washington for help. 
In fact, the US was the first to respond to last year’s crisis 
by sending troops and planes on contingency, and they 
promised to stay for as long as needed. That presence may 
not be permanent, but it will persist for the time being. 
We will see more, with the planned US Army’s equipment 
prepositioning base as well as the US Navy’s anti-ballistic 
base in north of Poland. This does not come for free, how-
ever; the bulk of Poland’s vast military spending plan may 
be placed with US defense contractors. But, in the opinion 
of Poland’s current decision makers, that will only help 
their strategic plans.
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New Helsinki Needed? A View from Russia
Alexander Nikitin
The Nature of the Crisis in Relations between  
Russia and the West
The current state of relations between Russia and the 
West does not amount to a full-fledged crisis or a “New 
Cold War.” Elements of crisis in Russian-Western rela-
tions coincide and merge with elements of interaction and 
even elements of cooperation in dealing with common 
threats. However, the present strains in interaction could 
at any moment turn into a real crisis, including a military 
confrontation – for example as the result of a naval inci-
dent in the Black Sea, the misinterpretation of military 
exercises, or a relocation of military infrastructure either 
belonging to NATO or to Russia/the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
In the political and diplomatic fields, Russia and the 
West will probably find new common ground relatively 
soon for normalizing their interactions in general (and 
certain key channels of interaction have remained open 
all along). In the military field, however, the new arms 
race could continue for decades, undermining disarma-
ment negotiations and treaties as well as creating op-
portunities for closer contact – and contests – between 
military infrastructures, both of which are prone to risk. 
There are a number of important differences between 
the current situation and the Cold-War conditions that 
prevailed from the late 1940s to the late 1980s?
1. The ideological component is absent or unclear. In the 
struggle between communism and capitalism – two 
mutually exclusive social and ideological projects 
imposing themselves on the political map – ideology 
constituted the key element. No opposing ideological 
models dominate the current confrontation, which 
appears more a matter of large geopolitical entities 
balancing their interests.
2. The scope of the confrontation is limited. While the 
Cold War confrontation was total, intruding into all 
spheres of relations, today’s standoff is more selective; 
apart from the political disagreements, everyday social, 
cultural, personal interactions between Russia and the 
West continue, albeit in a somewhat distorted way.
3. We are not teetering on the brink of a “hot war,” espe-
cially when it comes to the nuclear threat. The par-
ties in today’s confrontation are much more cautious. 
While the prevailing disagreements are certainly taken 
seriously, the conflict is not considered an existential 
one; no one today is questioning the very survival of 
either Russia or the West.
The history of international relations offers plenty of 
comparable confrontations. Although the situation is 
dangerous, it should not be dramatized. Political dialogue 
must be continued.
The Immediate Reasons and Deeper Roots  
of the Confrontation
While the West considers Russia’s actions toward 
Crimea and its support of separatism in eastern Ukrai-
nian to be the cause of confrontation, the Russian view is 
that the West promoted illegal regime change in Ukraine 
and that Moscow subsequently only followed pragmatic 
methods – of the same sort used by the West in the former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.
This line of argument is not as important, however, as 
the need to reflect on the deeper roots of the disagree-
ments between Russia and the West:
 . The parties view world events differently and see their 
interests and opportunities being affected in different 
ways.
 . The parties have different views both about the place 
they occupy – or wish to occupy – in the world order 
and the places occupied by their counterparts.
 . The parties have different views on the availability and 
appropriateness of particular methods and tools for 
achieving their goals in international affairs.
At a time of global shifts, reduced roles of traditional 
Western powers, and emergence of new players from 
the former periphery, the configuration of players on the 
global stage is changing. Each country is driven by the 
desire to ensure its place in this new configuration. 
Many in Russia believe that the new post-Cold War sys-
tem failed to take Russian interests into account, whereas 
many in the West considered Russian expectations to be 
excessive. In Russia the perception gained traction that 
the Western powers do not consider it an equal partner, 
whereas the West disregarded Moscow’s growing irrita-
tion. Of particular concern to Moscow were the “color 
revolutions” taking place in several neighboring states – 
states in which the West supported the opposition. 
As an extended period of high oil and gas prices al-
lowed Russia to build up new strength, it no longer felt 
“down on the ground” as it did in the 1990s but felt able to 
state its interests more assertively.
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Could Actions in Syria Unite Russia and the West in 
a New Anti-ISIS Coalition?
Moscow’s present motives to engaging in Syria are based 
not only on self interest –stemming the spread of terror-
ism – but also on the desire to establish a broad interna-
tional coalition involving Russia, the West, and moderate 
Muslim states. At present there are three parallel coali-
tions: Russia and the forces of Bashar al-Assad; the West 
and the moderate Syrian opposition; and a coalition of 
moderate Muslim states against ISIS. Should these coali-
tions be unable to coordinate their efforts, however, a 
further deterioration of relations between Russia and the 
West could occur. 
The Need to Strengthen the Role of International 
Law 
Russia and the West accuse each other of violating basic 
principles of international law. In contrast to some West-
ern interpretations, Russia is in fact interested in setting 
up clear rules of conduct based on international law and 
the UN Charter.
The two possible scenarios are 1) a further erosion of 
basic principles of international law, leading to increas-
ing unilateralism or 2) concerted attempts to strengthen 
international law, with either the West or Russia – or both 
– taking a leading role
Russia’s permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
and its extensive legal tradition place it in a good position 
to call for a return to the basic principles of international 
law. This is to involve various areas of international law, 
including, among others, the prompt interpretation of UN 
mandates for operations in conflict zones legal limita-
tions on external interventions in civil wars; and calling 
to account parties – including states – that fund or supply 
direct or indirect support to terrorists.
A Window of Opportunity? Prospective Ways for 
Russia and the West to Interact
Even under deteriorating conditions, there are continuing 
formats for fostering political dialogue between Russia 
and the West. These include: The Normandy Format (in-
volving Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France) and the 
OSCE as the basis for the Minsk agreements; talks held on 
the margins of the OSCE, the UN, and the G20; summits 
in different formats involving heads of states; and direct 
military consultations in the context of coordinating ac-
tion in Syria.
Obviously there are many remaining real and poten-
tial fields for cooperation between Russia and the West. 
These include the joint fight against terrorism and ISIS; a 
resolution of the wider crisis in the Middle East.; imple-
menting the agreements with Iran; nuclear non-prolif-
eration; coordinating a multilateral response to North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions; implementing the START-III 
agreements to reduce strategic nuclear weapons and their 
deployment; and an exchange of experiences on migra-
tion issues.
Under the current circumstances, concrete political 
and diplomatic steps that could be taken by Russia and 
the West include:
 . Intensifying negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, 
and the West in a new Normandy Format, including a 
detailed study of the existing Minsk Agreements and 
the development of a “new Minsk Agreement” to settle 
the Ukrainian crisis 
 . Intensifying and expanding cooperation in the security 
sphere, for example developing joint actions against 
ISIS, conducting consultations, and coordinating efforts 
to address security challenges in such as Syria, Afghan-
istan, and North Korea, among others
 . Fostering dialogue between Russia and Western coun-
tries about the problems of migrants and refugees, and 
exchanging experience on related topics, for example 
with a summit on migration problems 
 . Reviving the NATO-Russia Council
 . Initiating new peacekeeping missions, including the 
joint participation of NATO contingents and CSTO 
peacekeeping forces in UN missions. 
 . Developing new proposals in the field of disarmament 
and arms control, including conventional arms control.
 . Initiating a joint summit on energy issues.
 . Strengthening the Helsinki process and developing a 
new comprehensive European security treaty and new 
security guarantees
 . Developing new initiatives for nuclear safety, promot-
ing the prevention of extending weapons into outer 
space, and jointly developing a code of conduct for 
outer space.
 . Establishing a new agreement for interaction between 
Russia and the EU in general and specifically working 
out new road maps for a free trade zone with Ukraine
 . Fostering three-way discussions involving the EU, Rus-
sia, and Ukraine on economic and trade issues
 . Promoting special bilateral discussions between Russia 
and Germany, Russia, and France, and Russia and other 
key EU powers
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 . Creating a Coordination Council of regional organiza-
tions and establishing a dialogue between the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EEC) and the EU as well as 
between the CSTO and NATO
 . Facilitating visas for EU citizens in Russia and Russian 
citizens in the EU
 . Developing permanent communication “hot lines” be-
tween Russia and NATO, especially for data exchange 
on large-scale military exercises, redeployment of 
troops, and so forth
 . Developing and strengthening the Vienna Document on 
Confidence- and Security-building Measures
 . Initiating a dialogue on the non-deployment of non-
strategic nuclear weapons outside national territories
 . Developing agreements on the prevention of provoca-
tive and risky military activities in the Baltic Sea and 
the Black Sea
In conclusion, the current period of manifest disagree-
ment requires serious efforts from both Russia and the 
West in order to avoid further confrontation and to pro-
mote the normalization of international interaction.
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